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NIFORM Commercial Code ("UCC") drafters have attempted
to reduce the role of juries in commercial cases by drafting pro-
visions in the UCC that assign the court' to decide as a question
*Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dean Emeritus Albert Rosenthal and Professors
Kenneth Kettering, Paul Shupack and Michael Zimmer. This research was supported by a
grant from the Loyola University Chicago Internal Research Awards Program.
1. The term "judge" or "court" in this article will be used in the sense of determiner
of law, rather than trier of fact in a non-jury trial. The reason is that the concerns discussed
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of law certain matters which have traditionally been decided by the jury.2
This article addresses the questions of whether the gradual erosion of the
right to a jury trial in UCC cases should be continued or reversed, and
whether or to what extent Article 1 should have a role in the process.
This article will first consider federal and state constitutional require-
ments of the right to a jury trial and their applicability to cases brought
under the UCC. It will then examine specific UCC provisions where the
drafters allocated to the court determination of matters that are typically
decided by the jury. A brief examination will then be made of the reac-
tion of some state bar committees, law revision commissions, and legisla-
tures to the question of the constitutionality of such reallocation under
state law. Next, the article will consider the constitutionality of the spe-
cific UCC provisions in light of traditional Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence, as well as recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of
the Seventh Amendment guarantee. 3 It will then examine the policies
favoring or opposing jury trials and will compare results of empirical
studies of jury performance with beliefs and attitudes upon which various
policy views are based. Finally, the question of whether Article 1 has a
role with respect to this issue will be considered.
The article concludes that reallocation by the drafters of factual mat-
ters to the court is both constitutionally troubling and not justified on
policy grounds. Such a practice has caused and will continue to cause
states to adopt non-uniform versions of proposed laws, undercutting a
fundamental purpose of the UCC, which is to promote uniform applica-
tion of the law. This article also suggests that Article 1, which states the
purposes and policies of the UCC, should help prevent the general ero-
sion of the right to jury trial by affirming that this right under the UCC
extends to all parties to the full extent of federal and state constitutional
and statutory law and policy.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
A. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court
in modern times makes clear that in cases arising under the UCC, parties
will almost always have a jury-trial right in federal court. 4 Although the
Seventh Amendment has not been applied to the states through the Due
relate to the proper allocation of an issue between judge and jury, and not between judge
as trier of fact and judge as determiner of law.
2. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 4A-202, 5-108(e) (2000).
3. The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 when a cause of action
under the UCC is tried in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction,
or as a pendent state claim, the right to a jury trial is determined as a
matter of federal law under the Seventh Amendment, even though the
substantive law applicable to the cause of action is state law.6 An exami-
nation of the Court's traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence as it
has developed in the twentieth century makes clear that in most UCC
cases, the parties will be entitled to a jury trial.7 One strand of Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence provides that the right to a jury trial is based
upon an "historical test": if the action, or an analogous action, would
have been brought at common law rather than in equity or admiralty in
1791, the time of the Seventh Amendment's ratification, then the right to
jury trial will be preserved. 8 The Court has made clear that not only com-
mon law rights, but also statutory rights are protected by the Seventh
Amendment guarantee "if the statute creates legal rights and remedies,
enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."9
Thus, if the rights protected by statute are analogous to rights that would
have been enforceable in the courts of law, as opposed to the courts of
equity or admiralty, there is a jury-trial right.10 In determining whether a
particular claim is analogous to one tried at common law in 1791, the
Court uses a test formulated in Tull v. United States: "[f]irst, we compare
the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of En-
gland prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we
examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable
in nature."" The Court has emphasized that of the two prongs of the
5. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) ("The Court has not held that
the right to jury trial in civil cases is an element of due process applicable to state courts
through the Fourteenth Amendment.").
6. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (holding that "the right to a jury
trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in diversity as well
as other actions."); Reiner v. New Jersey, 732 F. Supp. 530 (D.N.J. 1990) (stating that the
plaintiff with a pendent state claim is entitled to a jury trial because the right to a jury in
federal court is determined by federal law); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958) (holding that federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact
questions should not yield to contrary state rule).
7. This constitutional jurisprudence is comprised of four different strands: (1) the
"historical" test; (2) the requirement that the substance of the jury trial right must be pre-
served; (3) the preservation of the jury trial when issues of law and equity are joined; and
(4) the deference to a Congressional statutory scheme involving public rights. See Mar-
garet L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amend-
ment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 183 (2000) (providing an in depth discussion
of the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence and the reasoning of Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
8. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) ("The
right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common
law when the amendment was adopted.").
9. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 (holding that the Seventh Amendment applies not only to
suits based on the common law, but also to statutory causes of action).
10. The Supreme Court articulated the basic task as one of determining "whether a
statutory action is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in
courts of equity or admiralty." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
11. Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted).
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historical test, the second prong, pertaining to remedy, is far more impor-
tant that the first prong, which deals with the nature of the action. 12
Under the historical test, UCC cases almost always have actual or close
historical analogues at common law, as actions for damages or debt.
Moreover, since the remedy sought in contracts and commercial cases is
almost invariably money damages, UCC cases tend to be prototypical ex-
amples of an action at law, to which the Seventh Amendment applies. 13
A second strand of the Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence
concerns the scope of the requirement that the right to a jury trial must
be "preserved." The Court has repeatedly held that what must be pre-
served is the substance of the jury-trial right, as opposed to mere matters
of pleading or practice. 14 Throughout more than two hundred years of
the Amendment's existence, the Supreme Court has interpreted the sub-
stance that must be preserved as the jury's fact-finding role in suits at
common law.' 5 Although a given UCC case, like any other litigated mat-
ter, may not be subject to a jury trial as the result of procedural devices
such as summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, or because the
parties waived their jury-trial right, frequently, in litigation of UCC mat-
ters, disputed fact-specific issues arise which are exclusively within the
province of the jury.
Thus, in a typical UCC case tried in federal court, the parties will have
a jury-trial right. The jury's function in a federal court case has been well
delineated by the Supreme Court. The jury finds facts, determines credi-
bility, weighs contradictory evidence and draws inferences from the
facts. 16 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that "[t]he Seventh
12. See id. at 421. "We reiterate our previously expressed view that characterizing the
relief sought is '[m]ore important' than finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of
action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial." Id. (citing
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196).
13. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 ("More important, the relief sought here-actual and
punitive damages-is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.").
14. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Gasoline Prods. Co. v.
Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-12 (1920);
Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
15. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 372; Gasoline Prods., 283 U.S. at 494; Ex parte Peterson,
253 U.S. at 309-12; Walker, 165 U.S. at 593. Although the Court in Galloway did not artic-
ulate what it thought the fundamental elements of the jury trial were, it cited as authority
Gasoline Products, Ex parte Peterson, and Walker, all of which defined as fundamental the
jury's role as the finder of facts.
16. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of le-
gitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The weight and credibility of a witness'
testimony "belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelli-
gence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men; and so long as we havejury trials they should not be disturbed in their possession of it, except in a case of manifest
and extreme abuse of their function." Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628
(1944) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)).
It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the
contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, re-
ceives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts.
The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences
and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. That conclusion,
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Amendment ... requires that questions of fact in common law actions
shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume directly or
indirectly to take from the jury or to itself such prerogative.' 17
The general rule, therefore, is that in cases where there is a jury, the
jury's function is to decide questions of fact. The judge, on the other
hand, will determine matters of law.18 While the line between issues of
law and issues of fact is not always clear, there are some generally ac-
cepted views as to the difference. Questions of fact tend to be very spe-
cific issues pertaining to the particular case at bar.19 Questions of law
tend to be "fact free general principles that are applicable to all, or at
least to many disputes, and not simply to the one sub judice.''20 In sum, a
question of law for the judge tends to be a general proposition, while a
question of fact for the jury tends to involve a case-specific inquiry.21
Even though the demarcation is not always a bright line, most judges, in
most cases, tend to have a good sense of the difference between matters
of fact and matters of law.
B. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
In all but two states there is a constitutionally-based right to a civil jury
trial. Louisiana and Colorado, which do not provide for the right by con-
stitution, nonetheless provide the protection by statute and by court rule,
respectively. 22 While in most states the scope of the civil jury trial paral-
lels the federal right guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, there are
some differences. As in federal court, many states determine the right to
a jury trial by an historical test, based on whether there was a right to a
jury at common law at the time of adoption of the particular state consti-
whether it relates to negligence, causation or any other factual matter, cannot
be ignored. Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the
jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or
conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.
Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (citations omitted).
17. Walker, 165 U.S. at 596. In addition, in Byrd, the Court noted that "[an] essential
characteristic of [the federal] system is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it
distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the com-
mand -of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to
the jury." 356 U.S. at 537.
18. There are, of course, gray areas in the fact/law distinction, exceptions, and ques-
tions as to the extent to which any particular fact question is constitutionally mandated to
be determined by a jury. See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact
Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1867 (1966).
19. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Newman, J., dissenting), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
20. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question,
and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 995 n.3 (1986). Louis observes that the
"classification of ultimate facts as questions of law amounts to a manipulation of the law-
fact doctrine to take questions from the jury." Id. at 1028.
21. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 1009 (Newman, J., dissenting).
22. See CoLo. R. Civ. PROC. 38; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1731.
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tution, and whether legal or equitable relief is sought.2 3 Because many
states have amended their constitutions at various times, the specific time
used by different state courts as a point of reference varies widely.24
While variations exist in state practice, nonetheless, the basic right to a
jury trial is protected in all states. Commercial cases, in which money
damages are the most common form of relief, will generally have a jury-
trial right, unless that right has been waived, or unless there are no under-
lying disputed facts. State courts appear to take the same view as federal
courts of the jury's function to find facts, weigh evidence, determine cred-
ibility, and draw proper inferences from disputed facts.25
When UCC drafters attempt to shift the traditional allocation of cer-
tain facts from jury to judge, they are testing the scope of both federal
and state constitutional requirements, as well as the policy bases for the
jury's role in the civil jury system. The next section of this article will
consider the specific UCC provisions where the drafters allocated to the
court matters of fact normally determined by juries.
II. SPECIFIC UCC PROVISIONS ALLOCATING DECISIONS
TO THE COURT
To understand in context provisions in the UCC where the drafters
chose to allocate matters to the judge rather than the jury, we will con-
sider below three UCC sections: 4A-202(c), 5-108(e), and 1-201(10).26
Sections 4A-202(c) and 5-108(e) are products of relatively recent revi-
23. New York courts, for example, look to common law actions tried to a jury before
1777, when the first New York constitution was ratified. See In re DES Mkt. Share Litig.,
591 N.E.2d 226 (N.Y. 1992). New Jersey courts, on the other hand, generally refer to the
right of jury trial as it existed at the time of the adoption of the 1947 constitution. See State
v. Anderson, 603 A.2d 928, 936 (N.J. 1992).
24. See Anderson, 603 A.2d at 936. Another difference from federal practice is that
some states maintain a distinction between law and chancery courts, and this has some-
times resulted in rules that differ from federal rules. In some states, for example, where
legal and equitable issues both arise from the same fact situation, if the overall nature of
the action is equitable, none of the claims will be tried to a jury. See Bruce D. Greenberg
& Gary K. Wolinetz, The Right to a Civil Jury Trial in New Jersey, 47 RUTGERS L. REV.
1461, 1472 (1995); see also, Steiner v. Stein, 66 A.2d 719 (N.J. 1949). If an independent
legal claim is tried with an equitable claim, it may be tried to a jury but only after the
equitable claims have been resolved. See Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 24, at 1479.
This differs from federal court practice, where legal claims are almost always tried first in
order to preserve the jury trial right. See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,
510 (1959).
25. Lofy v. S. Pac. Co., 277 P.2d 423, 425 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that ajury's role is to draw proper inferences when facts in dispute); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 117
N.E.2d 74, 80 (I11. 1954) (jury question whether circumstances surrounding defendant's
violation of statute may be proximate cause of damage that followed); Guzzi v. Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co., 90 A.2d 23, 26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (jury question
whether defendant's installation and maintenance of gas supply conformed to standard
practice in industry).
26. While UCC Section 2-302 allocates to the court as a matter of law the decision as
to whether a contract or a provision of it is unconscionable, this is not constitutionally
troubling because the issue of unconscionability has always been considered an equitable
issue. It has long been established that the right to a jury trial is preserved for actions at
law, not equity.
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sions where a reallocation occurred.2 7 Section 1-201(10), on the other
hand, has since the 1950s allocated the determination of "conspicuous" to
the court for decision as a matter of law. Both the definition of conspicu-
ousness, as well as the question of whether it should always be a matter
for the court, are being reconsidered in the current revision process of
Articles 1, 2, and 2A.
A. SECTION 4A-202(c)
UCC Article 4A governs funds transfers, focusing primarily on elec-
tronic or "wire" transfers between business or financial institutions.28 An
important question among participants who deal in wire transfers is who
will be liable if money suddenly disappears from an account by means of
an unauthorized wire transfer. The "mysterious interloper" problem re-
quires one party to bear the loss in a situation where there may be no way
to determine which party was at fault.29 To resolve this problem, the
drafters of Article 4A provided that a bank would not be liable for an
unauthorized payment order if it paid the order in good faith and in com-
pliance with a commercially reasonable security procedure designed to
prevent unauthorized payment orders.30
To understand this issue in context, assume the worst happens. A cor-
porate bank account which contained 50 million dollars at 10:00 a.m., has
a zero balance at 10:05 a.m., and the corporate account holder-the cus-
tomer-who discovers this a few hours later, did not authorize the pay-
ment order. Who bears the loss? In a suit by the customer against the
bank, the bank's defense is that it acted in compliance with a commer-
cially reasonable security procedure. Assume there are no agreements
between bank and customer as to any limitation of liability of the bank,
or as to the effect of unauthorized payment orders paid by the bank.
Thus, the case will turn on whether or not the security procedure used by
the bank was commercially reasonable. 31  This specific question-
27. UCC Article 4A was approved in 1989, and UCC Article 5 in 1995.
28. See U.C.C. art. 4 (2000). According to the Prefatory Note to Article 4A, the value
of wire transfer payments exceeds one trillion dollars per day.
29. See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some
Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 743, 762
(1993) (discussing the drafting committee's response to this problem).
30. UCC Section 4A-202(b) provides in pertinent part:
If a bank and its customer have agreed that the authenticity of payment or-
ders issued to the bank in the name of the customer as sender will be verified
pursuant to a security procedure, a payment order received by the receiving
bank is effective as the order of the customer, whether or not authorized, if
(i) the security procedure is a commercially reasonable method of providing
security against unauthorized payment orders, and (ii) the bank proves that it
accepted the payment order in good faith and in compliance with the security
procedure and any written agreement or instruction of the customer restrict-
ing acceptance of payment orders issued in the name of the customer.
U.C.C. § 4A-202(b) (2000).
31. Even if the security procedure was reasonable, the customer could still prevail if it
could prove that the order was not caused directly or indirectly by anyone who had ever
been under its control or had obtained access to pertinent information from it as to the
2001]
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whether a security procedure is commercially reasonable-was declared
by the drafters to be a question of law for the court:
Commercial reasonableness of a security procedure is a question of
law to be determined by considering the wishes of the customer ex-
pressed to the bank, the circumstances of the customer known to the
bank, including the size, type, and frequency of payment orders nor-
mally issued by the customer to the bank, alternative security proce-
dures offered to the customer, and security procedures in general use
by customers and receiving banks similarly situated. 32
Does the requirement that commercial reasonableness be decided as a
question of law deny the customer a right to a jury trial? Assuming the
case was brought in state court, the answer would turn on the protection
given by the state constitution. If it were in federal court by reason of
diversity (a New Jersey corporation using a bank in New York City, for
example), or a pendant state claim, the Seventh Amendment would de-
termine whether there is a jury-trial right.
In both cases, the courts would first use the historical test to determine
whether this is the kind of claim that would have been heard in courts of
law at the time of the adoption of the relevant constitution. While crea-
tive lawyering could suggest a number of possible causes of action, the
most likely ones, such as breach of contract, breach of bailment, or con-
version, all had a right to a jury trial in common law courts at the end of
the eighteenth century when the Seventh Amendment and the earliest
state constitutions were adopted. 33 In addition, the remedy sought by the
customer-money damages-is also an important indicator that this is
the kind of action that has a jury-trial right, because money damages were
sought primarily in courts of law, not courts of equity.34
Having determined that this is the kind of action where there was a
right to a jury trial, the courts would then need to determine whether the
statutory provision allocating commercial reasonableness to the court to
decide as a matter of law impinged upon the right to a jury trial. Since
courts have repeatedly defined the substance of the jury trial right as be-
ing the preservation of the jury's fact-finding role, if there are disputed
factual issues, it would appear that requiring these facts to be determined
by the court as a matter of law would interfere with the jury-trial right.35
The statute itself makes clear that the particular provision at issue here is
heavily fact specific, so there may well be disputed facts. Section 4A-
security procedure. See U.C.C. § 4A-203. In most cases of this kind, such proof of a nega-
tive would be difficult if not impossible to establish. For purposes of this hypothetical, we
will assume the customer is unable to establish this proof.
32. U.C.C. § 4A-202(c).
33. See Valley Steel Prods. Co. v. Darco, 147 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992)
("The ... counts alleging breach of contract, breach of bailment and conversion are the
type of common law causes for which the Seventh Amendment preserves a party's right to
a jury trial.") (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg , 492 U.S. 33, 40-43 (1989)).
34. See supra notes 8-11, 13 and accompanying text.
35. If there were no disputed facts, the court could, of course, decide the issue of
commercial reasonableness as a matter of law regardless of what the statute provided.
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202(c) provides that what must be considered by the court in determining
commercial reasonableness as a question of law are:
the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances
of the customer known to the bank, including the size, type, and fre-
quency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to the
bank, alternative security procedures offered to the customer, and
the security procedures in general use by customers and receiving
banks similarly situated. 36
These are specific factual issues. There is no "question of law" here in
the sense of "fact free general principles applicable to all, or at least to
many disputes, and not simply to the one sub judice."37 Since a fact-spe-
cific inquiry is required, if any of the facts are disputed, they raise the
kinds of questions that are typically within the province of the jury.
A comparison with other determinations of "commercial reasonable-
ness" in the UCC demonstrates that generally, the jury resolves disputed
questions. There are a number of cases under Article 9 interpreting
"commercial reasonableness" of a sale by a secured party of collateral
after a default by a debtor. These cases all send disputed fact questions to
the jury. 38 It could possibly be argued that a "commercially reasonable"
sale is more likely to create disputed factual issues than a "commercially
reasonable" security procedure. Even if true, when there is a disputed
factual issue as to what is a commercially reasonable security procedure,
the issue should go to the jury, since normally the question of reasonable-
ness is for the jury.39
In addition to the Article 9 cases on commercial reasonableness, UCC
articles which define good faith as "honesty in fact and reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing," (which currently include all but Article
5 and Article 2 for non-merchants) treat the determination of reasonable
36. U.C.C. § 4A-202(c).
37. Louis, supra note 20, at 995 n.3; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. River City Constr., Inc., 743 F.2d 871, 878 (11th
Cir. 1984) ("Generally the issue of commercial reasonableness is a question for the jury.")(citing Henderson v. Hanson, 414 So.2d 971 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)); see also FDIC v. Forte,
535 N.Y.S.2d 75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("Whether a sale was commercially unreasonable
is, like other questions about 'reasonableness', a fact-intensive inquiry."); United States v.
Conrad Publ'g Co., 589 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Whether a sale of collateral was
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner is essentially a factual question."). Where
there are no disputes as to material facts, however, the issue becomes a question of law.
See Advanced Irrigation, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Fargo, 366 N.W.2d 783, 786 (N.D. 1985)
(determining commercial reasonableness as a matter of law is only appropriate "where all
of the inferences support the conclusion that the sale was commercially reasonable. Ques-
tions of fact become questions of law when reasonable men can reach but one
conclusion.").
39. Reasonableness is only for the court when the evidence is so clear that no reasona-
ble person could determine the issue in any way but one. See e.g., Amfac v. Waikiki
Beachcomber Inv. Co., 839 P.2d 10 (Haw. 1992); Advanced Irrigation, 366 N.W.2d at 786
(determination of commercial reasonableness as a matter of law is only appropriate
"where all of the inferences support the conclusion that the sale was commercially reasona-
ble. Questions of fact become questions of law when reasonable men can reach but one
conclusion.") (citing City of Hazelton v. Daugherty, 275 N.W.2d 624, 627 (N.D. 1979)).
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commercial standards as a matter for the jury.40 In Kuwait Airway Corp.
v. American Security Bank, for example, the court ruled that
"[c]ommercial reasonableness is a question of fact for the jury. It is not
an issue to be decided as a matter of law." 41
The official comment to Section 4A-202 (which is combined with Sec-
tion 4A-203 and found following Section 4A-203) fails to discuss the con-
stitutional implications of allocating to the court the kind of factual issues
that in other parts of the UCC are considered to be matters for the jury.
Nor is there any suggestion that jury determinations of commercial rea-
sonableness under other sections of the UCC have created any significant
problems. The official comment offers, however, two justifications for
changing the allocation from jury to judge. First, it asserts that it is "ap-
propriate" to make this issue a matter of law because "security proce-
dures are likely to be standardized in the banking industry. '42 Second, it
states, "a question of law standard leads to more predictability concern-
ing the level of security that a bank must offer to its customers. '43 There
is, however, no evidence or authority offered to support either state-
ment.44 Curiously, the assertion that security procedures are likely to be
40. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 370 n.6 (1980). Good faith is generally considered to
be a question for the jury. See id.
41. 890 F.2d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The question was whether under Section 3-
419(3) [now Section 3-420(c)] the depositary bank acted "in accordance with the reasona-
ble commercial standards applicable to the business." Id. The court noted further that as a
narrow exception, some courts had found "commercially unreasonable as a matter of law
for a bank to take for deposit in an individual account a check made payable to a corpora-
tion, without first ascertaining the authority of the depositor/indorser." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded) (referring to similar determinations cited in American Machine Tool Distrib. Ass'n v.
Nat'l Permanent Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n, 464 A.2d 907, 913-15 (D.C. 1983)). According to
the court, however, that "aside from this one fairly widely recognized exception, whether a
bank acted in a commercially reasonable manner is usually a question of fact." Kuwait
Airways, 890 F.2d at 464; see also Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Shawmut Bank of R.I., N.A., 812 F.
Supp. 301 (D.R.I. 1993) ("[T]he question of whether a bank acted with commercial reason-
ableness is ordinarily a question of fact .... [T]he fact that a particular practice is common
among banks does not establish that it is commercially reasonable.") (citations omitted).
Whether the bank can establish under commercially reasonable standards it was not con-
tributorily negligent under UCC Section 3-406 in failing to verify signatures on checks
presented to it for payment is also a question for the trier of fact. See Buse v. Vanguard
Group, No. Civ. A. 91-3560, 1996 WL 744899, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1996) (citing Ku-
wait Airways, 890 F.2d at 464 ("commercial reasonableness is a question of fact and 'is not
an issue to be decided as a matter of law"')); Torino Constr. Corp. v. Ensign Fed. Credit
Union, 908 P.2d 702, 705 (Nev. 1995) ("The determination of whether a party conformed
to reasonable commercial standards is a question for the trier of fact.").
42. U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4, para. 2.
43. Id.
44. It is apparently not unusual for official comments to be based on the drafters'
beliefs or hunches. A number of participants in the UCC drafting process have criticized
the lack of empirical evidence to support many drafting decisions. James J. White, for
example, the Reporter for Revised Article 5, noted the lack of empirical evidence underly-
ing decisions made in connection with the Article 5 revision process. His concern was that
"the debate over law is among lawyers, not scientists, and is almost completely devoid of
reliable empirical data." James J. White, The Influence of International Practice on the
Revision of Article 5 of the UCC, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 189, 213 (1995). Edward L.
Rubin, the former chair of the American Bar Association subcommittee on revisions to
Articles 3 and 4, has also decried the lack of empirical research by attorneys involved in
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standardized appears to be undercut by the official comment itself, which
suggests that security procedures in fact vary widely:
The concept of what is commercially reasonable in a given case is
flexible. Verification entails labor and equipment costs that can vary
greatly depending upon the degree of security that is sought. A cus-
tomer that transmits very large numbers of payment orders in very
large amounts may desire and may reasonably expect to be provided
with state-of-the-art procedures that provide maximum security. But
the expense involved may make use of a state-of-the-art procedure
infeasible for a customer that normally transmits payment orders in-
frequently or in relatively low amounts. Another variable is the type
of receiving bank. It is reasonable to require large money center
banks to make available state-of-the-art security procedures. On the
other hand, the same requirement may not be reasonable for a small
country bank .... The type of payment order is another variable.45
The standard must be "flexible" because there are so many possible
variables. The high level of variables does not lend support to the justifi-
cation offered in support of reallocating commercial reasonableness to
the judge-that security procedures are likely to be standardized.
Rather, it suggests an almost inevitable need for a "fact-specific inquiry,"
which is within the province of the jury, not the court.
The second justification given in the official comment-that a "ques-
tion of law standard leads to more predictability"-is apparently a sug-
gestion that judges render more predictable decisions than juries. There
is, however, no evidence that judges are generally more predictable than
juries. 46 On the other hand, the proffered justification may be based on
the belief that since judges (sometimes) publish their decisions, the writ-
ten record will provide a better basis than a jury verdict for predicting a
bank's responsibility in other cases. Even this is far from certain, how-
ever, because of the great variability in possible situations and the fact-
specific nature of the decision, as discussed in the official comment. The
large potential number of variables will cause each decision to almost
inevitably turn on a case-by-case analysis of specific facts. As a result,
one decision may not be helpful to predict future decisions based on a
different combination of variables. Thus, even if one were to disregard
the possible constitutional violation, the justifications offered in the offi-
cial comment do not make a persuasive case for taking questions of com-
mercial reasonableness away from the jury.
Finally, the official comment states that although commercial reasona-
bleness is to be decided as a question of law, a second question,
"[w]hether the receiving bank complied with the procedure" is a question
the preparation of uniform laws. See Rubin, supra note 29, at 771-73 (pointing out that
lawyers on the committee had no interest in empirical research, although pertinent infor-
mation could have been obtained by fairly simple surveys in far less time than the fourteen
years it took for the process of revision).
45. U.C.C. §§ 4A-202 to -203 cmt. 4, para. 1.
46. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
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of fact. 47 This second question-whether the bank did what it was sup-
posed to do and complied with the pertinent standard it was required to
meet-has typically been found to be within the jury's province,48 and the
drafters in this case took a position consistent with that traditional view
of the jury's role. As we will next see, however, the drafters of revised
Article 5 went one step further and mandated that the bank's conduct,
and whether it met the standard, should be determined by the court as a
matter of law.
B. SECTION 5-108(E)
The revised version of Article 5 of the UCC, which deals with letters of
credit, has been adopted by a majority of the states.49 Section 5-108 con-
cerns the issuing bank's rights and obligations. Subsection (e) provides
that "[a]n issuer shall observe standard practice of financial institutions
that regularly issue letters of credit. Determination of the issuer's obser-
vance of the standard practice is a matter of interpretation for the court.
The court shall offer the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evi-
dence of the standard practice. '50
In the critical second sentence, the drafters allocated to the court an
issue that the official comment to Section 4A-202 declared to be a matter
for the jury-whether the bank complied with the relevant standard. The
question of whether a defendant met a particular standard has tradition-
ally been a question for the jury, in both state and federal court.51 Thus,
by changing the allocation from jury to judge, the provision appears to
47. U.C.C. §§ 4A-202 to -203 cmt. 4, para. 2.
48. O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776, 780 (2d Cir. 1929) (whether attorney conducted litiga-
tion in reasonably skillful manner was a jury question); City of Philadelphia v. Welsbach St.
Lighting Co. of Am., 218 F. 721, 729 (3d Cir. 1915) (holding that since "the contract re-
quired tests to be made by any method sanctioned by standard practice," it was proper for
trial court to submit to jury question of whether method followed was the one contem-
plated by the contract); Pac. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228
(Minn. 1937) (noting that the care required in performance of contractual duty is question
for the jury); Passarello v. Lexington Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 933, 936 (D. Conn. 1990) (not-
ing that a question of fact exists whether insurance broker complied with its duty of care in
obtaining insurance requested by plaintiff); Guzzi v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 90
A.2d 23, 26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (holding that the question of whether the
defendant's installation and maintenance of gas supply to plaintiff's home conformed to
standard practice in industry is question for the jury); Fund of Funds Ltd. v. Arthur Ander-
sen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314, 1357, 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that whether auditors'
conduct was breach of obligation to client under GAAS and GAAP and whether it was a
breach of engagement letter in failure to disclose irregularities were questions of fact for
the jury). Courts have sometimes reserved to themselves the application of law to the facts
in cases involving probable cause, such as malicious prosecution cases and false imprison-
ment cases. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 1910-18.
49. For an up-to-date list of state adoptions of Revised Article 5, see website of the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws at http://www.nccusl.org.
50. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (emphasis added). For an in-depth discussion of Section 5-
108(e), see Margaret L. Moses, The Uniform Commercial Code Meets the Seventh Amend-
ment: The Demise of Jury Trials Under Article 5?, 72 IND. L.J. 681 (1997).
51. See supra notes 16, 25 and accompanying text; infra note 65 and accompanying
text.
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impinge upon the jury-trial right, at least in cases where disputed material
facts are at issue.
The nature and scope of what has been allocated to the judge in the
second sentence of Section 5-108(e) must be analyzed in terms of the
three sub-questions which it encompasses: (1) what is the standard that
the bank must meet?; (2) what was the bank's conduct?; and (3) did the
bank's conduct meet the standard? The drafters appear to have intended
each of these sub-questions to be determined by the judge.
With regard to the standard in the first question, on its face, Section 5-
108(e) does not necessarily require the court to determine the standard.
It simply says that the court must determine if the bank complied with the
standard. The official comment, however, leaves no doubt about the
drafters' intent. It provides unequivocally that identifying and determin-
ing the nature and scope of the standard are matters for the court, not the
jury.52 Having a court determine a standard practice is not constitution-
ally troubling if the standard is a written one, embodied for example in a
code or a set of rules, since judges have traditionally had the task of inter-
preting written documents.53 Certain standard practices with respect to
letters of credit, for example, are found in written form in the Uniform
Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits ("UCP 500"). 54 The
problem, however, is that other standard practices are not written. The
official comment makes this clear:
The standard practice referred to in subsection (e) includes (i) inter-
national practice set forth in or referenced by the Uniform Customs
and Practice, (ii) other practice rules published by associations of fi-
nancial institutions, and (iii) local and regional practice. It is possible
that standard practice will vary from one place to another. Where
there are conflicting practices, the parties should indicate which
practice governs their rights. 55
52. The official comment for section 5-108(e) provides in pertinent part:
Identifying and determining compliance with standard practice are matters of
interpretation for the court, not for the jury. As with similar rules in Sections
4A-202(c) and 2-302, it is hoped that there will be more consistency in the
outcomes and speedier resolution of disputes if the responsibility for deter-
mining the nature and scope of standard practice is granted to the court, not to
a jury. Granting the court authority to make these decisions will also en-
courage the salutary practice of courts' granting summary judgment in cir-
cumstances where there are no significant factual disputes.
U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 1, para. 5 (emphasis added).
53. This stems from the system of pleading at common law. The terms of a contractual
condition were required to go into the plea. Objections to the plea were demurrers, which
raised an issue of law, requiring the court to deal with problems of interpretation. See
A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CoNTRACT 103 (1975). It has also
been suggested that from the time of the eighteenth century, interpreting written docu-
ments has been allocated to the court largely because most jurors were illiterate. See Pat-
rick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 75 (1980); see also Weiner, supra note 18, at 1932.
54. The UCP 500, although not law, governs most letters of credit by virtue of a stan-
dard clause to this effect in the body of each letter of credit. See Uniform Customs and
Practices for Documentary Credits (ICC Publication 500) (1993).
55. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 8, para. 1.
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According to the comment, in addition to being unwritten, standard
practices may vary from one place to another, be in conflict, and yet,
apparently, still be "standard." When such practices vary and conflict, it
seems likely that disputed factual questions, which are appropriate for
resolution by the jury, will arise.
A standard practice is essentially a trade usage, and when the practice
is not embodied in a written trade code, it must be determined by estab-
lishing what the trade usage is in this respect. According to UCC Section
1-205, "[t]he existence and scope of such a [trade] usage are to be proved
as facts.' '56 The official comment to Section 5-108(e), by asserting that
determining the nature and scope of standard practice is always for the
judge, appears in conflict with Section 1-205(2), which makes clear that
the decision is only for the judge when the practice is written, but that
otherwise it is to be proven as fact. This means that the jury must deter-
mine the disputed facts. Since official comments are not law, Section 1-
205(2) clearly trumps the official comment to Section 5-108(e). Thus, if a
bank were to assert that a particular practice was a standard practice in
the industry, but the particular practice was not embodied in the UCP 500
or other written form, a court should follow Section 1-205(2) and require
the scope and usage of the practice to be proved as facts, sending any
disputed fact issues to the jury.
The second question underlying the determination of the bank's obser-
vance of standard practice is: what was the actual conduct of the bank?
Determining what the bank did, that is, what steps it actually took, is
clearly a matter of fact. If the action or conduct of the bank were so clear
that no disputed facts would arise, no jury participation would be re-
quired. On the other hand, a bank's conduct could easily raise disputed
fact issues. In Bombay Industries v. Bank of New York, for example, an
issue was whether the bank had refused, in a timely manner, the docu-
ments presented by the beneficiary under the letter of credit.57 The par-
ties had waived a jury, but the court decided as a question of fact after a
bench trial the issue of the timeliness of the bank's refusal of docu-
ments.58 Thus, although Section 5-108(e) appears to require the judge to
determine as a matter of law what the bank's conduct was in order to
decide if its conduct accorded with standard practice, when this determi-
nation resolves a disputed factual question, in a jury case it should be
56. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (emphasis added).
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence
and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that
such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the inter-
pretation of the writing is for the court.
Id.
57. See No. 103064/95, 1997 WL 860671, *1 (N.Y. App. Div. May 21, 1997).
58. See id. It was determined that the bank had not properly refused the documents
and had therefore wrongfully dishonored the letter of credit. See id.
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determined by the jury.59
The final sub-question, concerning whether the bank's conduct com-
plied with the standard practice, requires a decision maker, whether
judge or jury, to make an evaluation of the facts in terms of their legal
consequences. A duty to meet a particular standard may be imposed by
statute, by contract, by common law or by trade usage. Whether that
duty has been met or not is generally considered a fact question for the
jury.60 In a letter of credit case, the liability of a bank may turn upon
whether its conduct came within the standard practice of the industry.
Thus, the duty, while imposed by statute, is defined by trade usage. Since
"determining the issuer's observance of the standard practice" depends
upon determining three subsidiary issues-the standard practice, the
bank's conduct, and whether the bank's conduct was consistent with the
standard practice-a traditional analysis would require the jury to deter-
mine what the trade usage was (i.e. standard practice), resolve any factual
disputes, draw appropriate inferences, and make the final decision as to
the issuer's liability by determining if its conduct complied with the stan-
dard practice. Without apparent consideration of possible constitutional
limitations, the drafters of Revised Article 5 drafted a statute that allo-
cated all of these tasks to the court.
59. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") offi-
cials and members of the drafting committee have appeared to concede that determining
the bank's conduct is a proper issue for the jury, even though this is not apparent from the
face of the statute. See infra note 76; see also, James E. Byrne, Revised UCC Section 5-
108(e): A Constitutional Nudge to Courts, 29 UCC L.J. 419, 423 (1997) ("If this issue [how
long it took the bank to give notice] is in dispute, and there is contradictory evidence, the
question is one of fact and within the scope of the right to trial by jury.").
60. O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776, 780 (2d Cir. 1929) (deciding jury question whether
attorney conducted litigation in reasonably skillful manner); City of Philadelphia v. Wels-
bach St. Lighting Co. of Am., 218 F. 721, 729-30 (3d Cir. 1915) (holding that because con-
tract required test to be made by any method sanctioned by standard practice, it was
proper for trial court to submit to jury question of whether method followed was the one
contemplated by contract, and also whether tests made upon the device employed were
pursuant to method sanctioned by standard practice); Fund of Funds Ltd. v. Arthur Ander-
sen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314, 1357, 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that whether auditor's
conduct was breach of obligation to client under GAAS and GAAP, and whether it was
breach of engagement letter to fail to disclose irregularities, were questions of fact for
jury); Soc'y of Mt. Carmel v. Fox, 335 N.E.2d 588, 590 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (arguing defen-
dant's alleged negligence "is a question of fact to be determined by application of profes-
sional standards and practices existing at the time the building was designed"); Pac. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228 (Minn. 1937) (holding care re-
quired in performance of contractual duty is question for jury); Guzzi v. Jersey Cent.
Power & Lighting Co., 90 A.2d 23, 26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (explaining question
of whether defendant's installation and maintenance of gas supply to plaintiff's home con-
formed to standard practice in industry is question for jury). Courts have sometimes re-
served to themselves the application of law to facts in cases involving probable cause, such
as malicious prosecution cases and false imprisonment cases. See Weiner, supra note 18, at
1910-18. There is also a minority view expressed in certain North Carolina cases, which
appears to give the trial judge authorization to pass upon the reasonableness of a party's
conduct. These cases can also be explained, however, by the court's belief that only one




Section 1-201(10), which contains the definition of "conspicuous," pro-
vides that "[w]hether a term or clause is 'conspicuous' or not is for deci-
sion by the court."' 61 Allocating to the court the determination of
whether a term or clause is conspicuous is not constitutionally troubling if
the task is consistent with a function the court has performed since the
eighteenth century-interpreting written documents. 62 A close look at
the task of determining if a term is conspicuous, however, suggests that
the judge is not performing the function of interpretation. Interpretation
consists of determining the meaning of a term or clause within its context,
or of determining the legal effect of the term.6 3 Determining whether a
term or clause is conspicuous, however, does not involve interpreting its
meaning or construing its legal effect. Rather, the question to be decided
is whether a reasonable person reading the language ought to have no-
ticed the particular term.64 If reasonable persons could differ, the matter
is for the jury.65
For the last few years, revisions of Articles 1, 2, and 2A, have all con-
sidered various definitions of conspicuous.66 Since Article 1 has a func-
tion of harmonizing the other UCC articles, the Revised Article 1
drafters decided to await the decision of the other drafting committees
and then either adopt a consistent definition, or perhaps move the defini-
61. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (2000). This section provides as follows:
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A
printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is con-
spicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or
other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is "con-
spicuous." Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision
by the court.
Id.
62. See supra note 53.
63. Sometimes "interpretation" is used in the same sense as "construction." Where
defined differently, the difference is generally stated to be that construction is the process
of determining legal effect, while interpretation is the process of determining the meaning
of words used. See e.g., Hornick v. Owners Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 370, 371 (Iowa 1993);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 cmt. c (1981).
64. The definition in the present version of Article 1 says that a term is conspicuous
"when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it." U.C.C. § 1-201(10); see also U.C.C. art. 2 (Tentative Draft December 1999)
(where Reporter's note describes the general test of conspicuous as whether "a reasonable
person ought to have noticed").
65. See McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991) ("If reasonable
persons, applying the proper legal standard, could differ as to whether the employer was a
'member of a crew,' it is a question for the jury."); see also Grandchamp v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 854 F.2d 381, 383 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that a trial court's decision whether
to send issue to jury is based on whether reasonable persons could differ); Smitley v. Cigna
Corp., 640 F. Supp. 397, 400 (D. Kan. 1986) ("It is generally recognized that it is the jury's
function to apply the reasonable person standard to a given fact situation ...."). On the
other hand, if a term were so clearly conspicuous (or so clearly not conspicuous) that no
reasonable person could decide otherwise, the judge should determine conspicuousness as
a matter of law.
66. Changes were considered necessary to make clear what "conspicuous" means in an
electronic context.
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tion from those articles to Article 1. Thus, it is useful to look at the defi-
nitions in various proposed revisions of Articles 1, 2, and 2A to see
whether "conspicuous" is likely to continue to be allocated to the court
for decision.
In Revised Article 2, the drafters did not initially require the court to
determine conspicuousness. 67 In the March 1997 draft, in a comment, the
Article 2 drafters recognized that, in some instances, it would be more
appropriate for a jury to resolve the question of conspicuousness. 68 The
comment states, "[u]nlike 1-201(10), the definition does not state that the
decision on conspicuous is for a court as a matter of law. Depending on
the circumstances, the decision is for the trier of fact. ' '69
The current drafts of Articles 2 and 2A, however, include a provision
allocating conspicuousness to the court for decision. 70 As for the most
recent version of Revised Article 1, the November 2000 draft indicated
that the definition of conspicuous in Article 1 would be deferred until the
completion of the drafting process for Articles 2 and 2A, presumably ei-
ther to incorporate a consistent definition, or simply to move the defini-
tion agreed upon in Articles 2 and 2A from those articles to Article 1.71
It appears likely, therefore, that the Revised Article 1 drafters will simply
accept the definition agreed upon by the drafting committees of Articles
2 and 2A and will allocate conspicuousness to the court for decision.
Nothing in any of the comments or notes indicates why the drafters of
Revised Article 2 changed their previously expressed view that the deci-
sion as to whether a term was conspicuous was sometimes more appropri-
ate for a jury. Nor have any policy reasons been given for allocating this
decision exclusively to the court as a matter of law. Other than the state-
ment by the Article 2 drafters in the March 1997 draft that, depending on
the circumstances, the decision on conspicuousness is for the trier of fact,
no discussion of this issue is found in the notes or comments of Revised
Articles 1, 2, or 2A. There is simply no focus on the jury-trial right or
whether this allocation to the court impinges on the right.
67. See U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(7) March 1997 Draft. Drafts of UCC articles can be found
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm.
68. In the March 21, 1997 draft, Section 2-102(a)(7) provided as follows:
"Conspicuous", with reference to a term, means so displayed or presented
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate would likely have
noticed it or, in the case of an electronic message intended to evoke a re-
sponse without the need for review by an individual, in a form that would
enable the recipient or the recipient's computer to take it into account or
react to it without review of the message by an individual. [The last sentence
in the July, 1996 draft was deleted. Compare 1-201(10), 2B-102(6).]
U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(7), March 1997 draft, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/
397art2.htm.
69. See U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(7), comment following March 1997 draft of revised Article 2
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/397art2.htm.
70. See U.C.C. § 2-102(10) November 2000 draft, available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc20600.htm; and U.C.C. § 2A-102(a)(8), November 2000 draft of Article
2A, available at http://www.law.upenn.eduIbll/ucl/ucc2a/2all00.htm.




It may be that the drafters of Revised Articles 2 and 2A went back to
the original position of Section 1-201(10) in order to minimize contro-
versy, in light of the level of controversy generated to date over other
revisions in Article 2.72 It may be that some reasonable rationale exists
for exclusively allocating to the court the determination of conspicuous-
ness. But no such rationale has been articulated, and the only mention of
the issue suggested that an exclusive allocation to the court is
inappropriate.
Having considered three specific provisions in the UCC that allocate
matters to the court for decision, we now turn to a consideration of the
constitutionality of such an allocation by various state law revision com-
missions, state bar committees, and state legislatures.
III. STATE RESPONSES TO UCC ALLOCATIONS
TO THE COURT
One of the important goals of the sponsoring organizations and draft-
ing committees of the Uniform Commercial Code and other uniform laws
is that the laws be adopted and that they be adopted uniformly. A num-
ber of states, however, have adopted non-uniform laws precisely because
of concern that the allocation to the court of factual matters for decision
violates the state constitutional right to a jury trial. The first state to
adopt a non-uniform version of Section 5-108(e) was New Jersey. 73 New
Jersey's Law Revision Commission ("New Jersey Commission") had
found that the second sentence of Section 5-108(e) as written appeared to
violate New Jersey's Constitution.74 That sentence provides that
"[d]etermination of the issuer's observance of the standard practice is a
matter of interpretation for the court."'75 The New Jersey Commission
found that "[e]valuating whether a bank meets a standard practice is
clearly a fact question ... that require[s] jury determination. Since sec-
tion 5-108(e) assigns an ordinary fact question to the court, it abridges the
constitutional right of jury trial."76 The New Jersey Commission thus rec-
72. In July 1999, NCCUSL, one of the two sponsoring organizations of the Uniform
Commercial Code, did not approve the draft of Revised Article 2, which had already been
approved by the other sponsoring organization-the American Law Institute ("ALI")-
the previous May. The two Article 2 reporters resigned, and the drafting committee for
Article 2 was reconstituted. See Joint Press Release of ALl and NCCUSL, dated August
18, 1999, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc-frame.htm.
73. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:5-108 (West Supp. 2000). Section 4A-202(c) was passed
by states without any focus on the constitutionality of giving a traditional issue like com-
mercial reasonableness to the court to decide. This was no doubt in part due to the general
deference of state legislators to the expertise of the UCC drafters. It was perhaps this lack
of focus on the issue in Article 4A that persuaded the drafters of Article 5 they could go
even farther in terms of reducing the jury's role.
74. See New Jersey Law Revision Commission, Final Report, Uniform Commercial
Code, Revised Article 5-Letters of Credit, June 1996, on file with the author and available at
http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us [hereinafter New Jersey Report].
75. U.C.C. § 5-108(e).
76. New Jersey Report, supra note 74, at 6. There is also a reference in the New Jersey
Report to testimony of Fred Miller, Executive Director of the NCCUSL, who testified at
hearings in New Jersey that the provision should be read so that the determination of the
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ommended, and the Legislature ultimately adopted, a non-uniform ver-
sion of the second sentence, which deleted the words "issuer's observance
of." This left the sentence to read as follows: "Determination of the stan-
dard practice is a matter of interpretation for the court. '77 While this
sentence no longer requires the court to determine whether the issuer
observed the standard practice, it is still somewhat troubling. The court's
determination of standard practice based on a written trade code, such as
the UCP 500, does not raise constitutional issues because of the long tra-
dition of courts interpreting written documents. 78 But some "standard
practices" may not be written.79 To the extent that there was a disputed
issue about what constituted a non-written "standard practice," it would
appear to be within the province of the jury to evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and resolve the factual question.
Section 5-108(e) was also considered and analyzed by a Subcommittee
of the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the Penn-
sylvania Bar Association (the "Pennsylvania Committee"). The Penn-
sylvania Committee concurred with the New Jersey Commission, stating
that "the Official Text as written could be read to permit the court to
adjudicate whether the issuer actually complied with standard practices,
and ... there is a serious question whether the statute, if so read, would
abrogate the constitutional right to a jury trial."'80 The Pennsylvania
Committee thus proposed to adopt the same wording as recommended
by the New Jersey Commission.81
The New York State Law Revision Commission ("New York Commis-
sion") went further than New Jersey and Pennsylvania. It first noted that
allocating to the court the determination of whether an issuer observed
the standard practice raised "a substantial question as to whether section
5-108(e) is in accord with the constitutional right to a jury trial guaran-
teed by both state and federal constitutions. '82 It further questioned
whether, even if the provision passed constitutional muster, there was
conduct of the bank would still be a jury question. The New Jersey Commission nonethe-
less felt that any ambiguity in the statute was best resolved by adopting a clear, non-uni-
form version. See id. at 6-7.
77. See id. at 7.
78. See supra note 53.
79. See U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 8 (noting that standard practice may be local or re-
gional, and may "vary from one place to another").
80. Report on the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code Modernization Act of
1998, Bill No. -, Prepared by the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 5, Subcommittee
(The "Pennsylvania Committee") of the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section
of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, on file with the author.
81. According to the NCCUSL website, Pennsylvania has not yet adopted Revised
Article 5, but the bill was introduced in 2000 and 2001 legislative sessions. See The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Introductions & Adoptions of
Uniform Acts, at http://www.nccusl.org/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca5htm
(last visited Mar. 27, 2001). However, after New York adopted a non-uniform version that
deleted the last two sentences of Section 5-108(e), the Pennsylvania Committee decided to
follow New York instead of New Jersey in this regard.
82. The New York State Law Revision Commission Report on the Proposed Revised
Article 5-Letters of Credit-of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter the "New
York Report"], on file with author, at 59. The New York Report also took note that,
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sufficient rationale "to justify a departure from the well-settled New York
statutory and common law policy favoring jury determination of disputed
factual issues."'83 The New York Report then analyzed both the New
York constitutional right to a jury trial and the New York statutory
right-existing since 1876-to a jury trial with respect to factual issues in
a lawsuit in which monetary damages are sought. It concluded that "both
the New York Constitution and statutory law would seem to require a
jury trial in letter of credit cases revolving around whether or not the
issuer observed the standard practice. '84 The report found that "[tihe
second sentence of Section 5-108(e) seemingly infringes impermissibly on
the right to a jury determination of [the underlying] factual questions" 85
and concluded that the statute "on its face seems to deviate from well-
settled constitutional, statutory and common law policy."' 86 Unlike the
New Jersey Commission and the Pennsylvania Committee, which ap-
proved the allocation to the court of the determination of standard prac-
tice, the New York Commission recognized that "[s]ometimes identifying
the standard practice is a question of law, but sometimes it is a question
of fact."' 87 The New York Commission then recommended to the New
York Legislature that it adopt a non-uniform version of Section 5-108(e),
which would delete both the second and third sentences of the section,
leaving only the first sentence: "An issuer shall observe standard practice
of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of credit."'88 The New
York Report concluded that such a change "reflect[s] sound and funda-
mental constitutional, common law and statutory New York policy,
serv[ing] only to strengthen Article 5."89
"[r]emarkably, the official comment [to Revised Article 5] fails completely to address the
possible constitutional issue raised by this provision." Id.
83. Id. at 60.
84. Id. at 63.
85. Id. at 63.
86. Id. at 67.
87. Id. at 64. The Report further noted in this regard,
According to the Official Comment, standard practice may be a local or re-
gional practice, §5-108(e), cmt. 8, thus involving a factual question as to the
unwritten practices of local or regional banks. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (stating
that the existence and scope of a usage of trade are to be proved as facts). It
is difficult to understand why determining what local banks do in a given
situation, and whether that is standard practice, is a question of law for the
court rather than a question of fact for the jury. As a result, restricting the
standard practice issues to the court may well contravene the well-settled
New York rule that resolution of disputed issues of material fact is ordinarily
the province of the jury.
New York Report, supra note 82, at 66.
88. Id. at 72.
89. Id. at 73. The New York legislature followed the recommendation of the New
York Commission to delete the last two sentences of 5-108(e). The governor signed the bill
on September 20, 2000. See New York Legislature, available at http://leginfo.state.ny.us:82/
nysleg/menugetf.cgi (search for bill number S08095). After New York adopted this non-
uniform version of Section 5-108(e), the Pennsylvania Committee recommended tracking
the New York version of this provision. In Pennsylvania Senate Bill 330, introduced in the
2001 legislative session, the last two sentences of Section 5-108(e) have been deleted, so
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In addition to New York and New Jersey, two other states have
adopted non-uniform versions of Section 5-108(e). Alabama adopted the
version of Section 5-108(e) recommended by the New York Commission,
eliminating the last two sentences of the provision, 90 and Wyoming omit-
ted the second sentence.91 Thus, a number of states apparently found
that the statute deviated from their state's constitutional and/or statutory
law and policy. Certainly, when NCCUSL and the ALl propose statutes
which raise constitutionally troubling issues, the likelihood of non-uni-
form adoption increases, defeating the stated goal of encouraging uni-
formity. Moreover, the constitutional issue will probably be raised
through litigation in many states where the uniform version was adopted,
unnecessarily increasing the costs of a plaintiff seeking to preserve the
jury trial right guaranteed by both state and federal constitutions. This
raises a serious question, which will be discussed in Part VI of this arti-
cle-whether allocation of matters between judge and jury is perhaps not
the kind of issue that should be decided by UCC drafting committees,
whose expertise is not in constitutional law nor in trial practice. 92
Constitutional protection of the jury trial issue would, of course, not be
determined by state law if a UCC case were brought in federal court. In
that instance, the court would look to the Seventh Amendment to see if a
state statutory provision violated the federal constitutional guarantee of a
jury-trial right.
IV. SEVENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF UCC
ALLOCATIONS TO THE COURT
Given the constitutionally troubling aspects of the three UCC provi-
sions discussed above, what is likely to happen in federal court if the right
to a jury trial is asserted in connection with one of the issues which the
UCC has designated as a matter for the court? Does the Seventh
Amendment require the judge to disregard the provision and send issues
designated for the court to the jury in order to preserve the guarantee of
a jury-trial right? A number of United States Supreme Court decisions
shed light on that question. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooper-
that the provision is identical to the version adopted in New York. Pennsylvania SB 330 is
available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WUO1/LI/BI/BT/2001/0/SBO330P0654.HTM.
90. See ALA. CODE § 7-5-108(e) (1997). In the "Alabama Comment," which follows
the Official Comment to Alabama Code section 7-5-108(e), the following explanation is
given, "Alabama elected not to adopt the last two sentences of uniform Section 7-5-108(e),
which would reserve matters of standard practice to determination by the court. Determi-
nation of standard practice is a matter of fact to be pled and proved." ALA. CODE § 7-5-
108 cmt. (1997).
91. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-5-108(e) (Michie 1999).
92. The New York Commission noted with some degree of surprise and puzzlement
that the drafters never addressed constitutional issues in their commentary. "Remarkably,
the official comment fails completely to address the possible constitutional issue raised by
this provision [5-108(e)]." New York Report, supra note 82, at 59. And further, "Curi-
ously, there is nary a word even about the Seventh Amendment in the uniform commen-
tary. See UCC § 5-108, official comment." Id. at 70 n.31.
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ative, Inc.,93 the question was whether judge or jury would decide the
issue of whether an employer was immune from suit by the employee of a
subcontractor under the state Workman's Compensation Act. 94 The
South Carolina Supreme Court had ruled in a prior case that immunity
under the statute was an issue for the court. 95 In Byrd, which was
brought in federal court on diversity grounds, the Supreme Court held
that there was a jury trial right on this issue in federal court.
The Court first considered whether Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins96
would require the Court to defer to the state practice. One factor the
Court found persuasive was that the decisions relied upon by the South
Carolina Supreme Court "furnish[ed] no reason for selecting the judge
rather than the jury."'97 The Supreme Court found that the state rule was
"merely a form and mode of enforcing" not "intended to be bound up
with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties. '98 It was
therefore not analogous to the reverse federal-state situation in Dice v.
Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.,99 where the Supreme Court
had found the right to jury trial was so substantial a part of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), that the Ohio court could not apply
its rule that a particular question was for the judge rather than the jury.100
In Byrd, which involved a federal court considering a judge-made state
rule, the Supreme Court found the state rule did not enjoy the same level
of deference as the federal jury-trial right in FELA cases, because there
was no indication that the judge-made rule was a substantial part of the
statute.
Of course, a state statute allocating a decision to the court, such as
Section 4A-202(c), might be more persuasive to a federal court than a
judge-made rule of decision, as in Byrd. On the other hand, the drafters
of the UCC provisions examined earlier provided no discussion of the
constitutional issues. Moreover, they provided rather perfunctory justifi-
cations in two provisions-Sections 4A-202(c) and 5-108(e)-and so far
have given no reasons for the allocation to the court to determine "con-
spicuous." The reasons asserted in the official comments to Sections 5-
108(e) and 4A-202(c) are the drafters' beliefs that: (1) judge based deci-
93. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
94. See id. at 539-40. The South Carolina Industrial Commission administers the
Workman's Compensation Act. On judicial review of the Commission's actions, the ques-
tion of whether the claim is within the Commission's jurisdiction is determined as a matter
of law by the court. When a case is initially brought in court, rather than before the Com-
mission, immunity under the Workman's Compensation Act can be asserted by a defen-
dant as an affirmative defense. In Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566 (S.C. 1957),
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the judge rather than the jury should decide
whether the defendant was a statutory employer and thus whether the defense was
sustained.
95. Adams v. Davison-Paxson Co., 96 S.E.2d 566 (S.C. 1957).
96. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
97. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
98. Id.
99. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
100. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
[Vol. 54
JURY-TRIAL RIGHT IN THE UCC
sions will be more consistent and speedier; a01 (2) allocation to the judge
will encourage summary judgments; 102 (3) "security procedures are likely
to be standardized in the banking industry; ' 10 3 and (4) a "question of law
standard leads to more predictability." 10 4 These reasons, which are es-
sentially unverified hunches, suggest that the allocation is "merely a form
and mode of enforcing," not "a substantial part of the cause of action,"10 5
and not "intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and
obligations of the parties.' 0 6 As such, a federal court might refuse to
enforce a provision allocating a decision to the judge on the ground that
the allocation was not a substantial part of the cause of action.
An even stronger reason for not enforcing the allocation is the federal
policy in favor of jury trials. The Court in Byrd looked at the question of
whether the federal system should defer to state rules in order to avoid a
different outcome because the federal forum applied its own rule.10 7 It
found, however, that even if the outcome might be affected, that was not
the only consideration.
The federal system is an independent system for administering justice
to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential characteris-
tic of that system is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it
distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influ-
ence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the de-
cisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury. The policy of uniform
enforcement of state-created rights and obligations cannot in every case
exact compliance with a state rule-not bound up with rights and obliga-
tions-which disrupts the federal system of allocating functions between
judge and jury.10 8
The Court then concluded that the federal court should not follow the
state rule because of the "strong federal policy against allowing state
rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts."10 9 It
noted that "in light of the influence of the Seventh Amendment, the func-
tion assigned to the jury 'is an essential factor in the process for which the
Federal Constitution provides."' 110 The Court also concluded that it was
not so clear that a different outcome would result from the fact that the
jury would decide the issue. It stated that "the likelihood of a different
result [was not] so strong as to require the federal practice of jury deter-
mination of disputed factual issues to yield to the state rule in the interest
of uniformity of outcome."'11 Thus, in Byrd, the Court did not hesitate to
101. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt. 1, para. 5 (2000).
102. See id.
103. U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4, para.2 (2000).
104. Id.
105. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
106. Id.
107. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
108. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 538.
110. Id. at 539 (citing Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931)).
111. Id. at 540.
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override an established state practice regarding the judge-jury allocation
in order to send disputed factual issues to the jury.
In a more recent case, Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,112
the Supreme Court overrode a federal statute that allocated a matter to
the court rather than to the jury. Feltner had been found liable for copy-
right law violation when his television stations continued to show certain
programs after Columbia Pictures revoked his license to show them. Co-
lumbia then opted, as permitted by statute, to seek statutory damages
rather than actual damages. 13 The statute provided that statutory dam-
ages would consist of an amount per infringement of between $500 and
$20,000 as "the court deems just. '114 The district court's decision denying
Feltner's request for a jury trial and awarding statutory damages of
$8,800,000 was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In re-
versing and remanding for a jury trial on the issue of amount of statutory
damages, the Supreme Court held that a jury trial was required under the
Seventh Amendment. 115 The Court also emphasized historical evidence
that "the consistent practice at common law was for juries to award dam-
ages."116 Feltner thus demonstrates that the Court will not uphold a fed-
eral statutory provision that departs from the traditional allocation to the
jury.
Thus, the Court in Byrd overrode a state practice of allocating a spe-
cific issue to the court and, in Feltner, struck down a provision of a federal
statute requiring a court to determine damages. However, the Court
took a less traditional view of the jury trial right in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.117 In Markman, the Supreme Court decided that inter-
preting the terms of art in a patent case, including any underlying dis-
puted facts, was exclusively a matter for the court. 1 8 The result was one
that was strongly sought by most of the judges of the Federal Circuit, and
appears to be in part based upon the Court's deference to that circuit's
specific expertise in the patent area as well as its need to administer an
appellate system that can promote uniformity nationwide."19
Some proponents of reducing the jury's role in UCC cases might view
Markman as support for reallocating issues to the court. As will be dis-
cussed below, however, analysis of Markman suggests that application of
112. 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1994).
114. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 340.
115. Columbia's position had been that the damages were equitable, and therefore
there was no jury-trial right. The Supreme Court, however, looked at historical evidence
which showed that in the eighteenth century in England and in this country, copyright suits
for monetary damages were tried in courts of law, and thus, before juries. Id. at 341. The
Court distinguished Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), where civil penalties claimed
by the government under the Clean Water Act were determined by the court. The Court
noted that no evidence was presented in Tull that juries historically had determined the
amount of civil penalties a party must pay the government. See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 340.
116. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 353.
117. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
118. See id. at 390.
119. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Moses, supra note 7, at 212-17, 231-37.
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the Seventh Amendment guarantee in private contract actions would be
viewed by the Court quite differently from the application of the guaran-
tee in the context of determining terms of art in a patent case.
Markman was a patent infringement case. The issue in Markman was
whether Westview had violated Markman's patent with respect to a dry-
cleaning system that tracked the progress of clothing through the dry-
cleaning process. 120 A jury found infringement, but the district court
granted Westview judgment as a matter of law.12 1
The question on appeal was whether judge or jury should construe the
terms of art within the patent's claim. Claim construction has tradition-
ally been considered a matter of law for the court because it involves the
interpretation of written documents.' 22 But patent claim construction
can be complex, particularly since the claims are not written for the pub-
lic, but for those skilled in the particular art. Frequently, expert testi-
mony is required to explain technological usages and meanings of terms
within the claim. The disputes involving the meaning of these underlying
terms of art have traditionally been decided by a jury.123 Markman ar-
gued that the District Court erred by substituting its construction of the
disputed claim for the one the jury had presumably given it. In affirming
the District Court, the Federal Circuit held that the interpretation of
claim terms was "the exclusive province of the court. '12 4
In affirming the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court employed a novel
analysis of the Seventh Amendment's requirements. Initially, the analy-
sis was consistent with traditional jurisprudence. Justice Souter referred
to the historical test, asking whether the cause of action was tried at law
at the time of the founding or was analogous to one that was.125 Justice
Souter, however, omitted any reference to the second prong of the histor-
ical test, which is whether the remedy sought is money damages.1 26 In an
infringement case, money damages are generally sought. Thus, under a
traditional analysis, it would be clear that the case had a jury-trial right
and that all disputed material factual issues would go to the jury. In
Markman, however, after acknowledging that an infringement case has a
120. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 370.
121. See id. at 375. Ultimately the Markman case turned on the meaning of the term
"inventory", which the District Court believed encompassed "both cash inventory and the
actual physical inventory of clothing." Id. It found that Westview's system did not infringe
Markman's patent because the Westview system could not track articles of clothing
throughout the cleaning process and generate reports about their status and location, and
therefore did not have the "means to maintain an inventory total." Id. Westview's system
merely recorded an inventory of receivables by tracking invoices and transaction totals.
122. See supra note 53.
123. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd,
517 U.S. 370 (1996); see also, A.H. WALKER, TEXTBOOK ON THE PATENT LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 536 (4th ed. 1904) ("[W]here the question of infringement
depends on the construction of the patent, and that construction depends upon a doubtful
question in the prior art, the latter question of infringement should also be left for the jury
to decide.").
124. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 967).
125. See id.
126. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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jury trial right, Justice Souter asserted a different second prong: "whether
the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the
substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791."127 This formu-
lation runs counter to Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the sub-
stance of the jury-trial right. Prior to Markman, the Court did not extract
a subsidiary issue from within a cause of action and determine whether it
alone had a jury-trial right.' 28
The Court's traditional jurisprudence has been one of approving
changes to various aspects of the civil jury trial so long as the substance of
the right is maintained. The Court has emphasized that the Seventh
Amendment is not intended "to perpetuate in changeless form the minu-
tiae of trial practice as it existed in the English courts in 1791."129 Rather,
what is critical is that such practices do "not curtail the function of the
jury to decide questions of fact.' 130 Justice Souter's analysis sounds as
though it fits within the Court's traditional Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence, since it uses the words "preserved the substance of the common
law right." But his test turns the traditional analysis on its head by de-
claring that the substance to be preserved is only what existed in 1791.
Instead of following the traditional position that practices can be freely
changed, so long as the jury's fact-finding role is preserved, Justice Sou-
ter's approach requires each subsidiary issue to have been decided by a
jury in 1791, or it is not part of the substance of the Seventh Amendment
guarantee. In other words, instead of adapting jury practices to modern
times while preserving the substance of the jury-trial right, Justice Souter
has asserted that 1791 practices will determine if sending a particular sub-
sidiary issue to the jury was part of that substance. If this approach were
generally followed, it could greatly restrict the right to a jury trial. There
are, however, a number of limiting factors set forth in Markman, which
suggest that this approach will not be widely used.
A unique mix of elements appeared to influence the Supreme Court's
decision. The Federal Circuit, by an eight-person majority, had made
clear what it wanted in Markman-de novo review of all constructions of
patent claims-which it could not have if juries or judges in bench trials
decided underlying terms of art as questions of fact.131 De novo review,
in which the appellate court owes no deference to any previous decision-
127. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
128. The sole previous use of this language was in Tull, but there it referred to whether
the jury should determine a civil penalty, not to a subsidiary issue within a cause of action.
And the Tull decision to take the damage issue away from the jury was criticized recently
by the Court in its decision in Feltner. In that case, the Court distinguished the Tull deci-
sion on damages. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355. The Court said the decision was "arguably
dicta," id. at 354 n.8, and that it was "in tension" with other Supreme Court cases. Id. at
355 n.9.
129. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 490 (1934) (Stone, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 491.
131. The standard of review for a trial judge's finding of fact is clear error; for a jury's
finding, it is substantial evidence to support the verdict. See Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 991 (Fed Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring), affd, 517 U.S. 370,
391 (1996).
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maker, is the standard of review for questions of law. If patent claims
could be construed exclusively as a matter of law, then the Federal Circuit
would have complete power of de novo review over the construction of
claims of a particular patent decided by any court in the country without
any deference to jury or trial judge as a fact finder. Since the same patent
can be infringed in different ways or by different parties, having de novo
review of the construction of all patent claims in the country should, in
the view of the Federal Circuit, lead to a more consistent and uniform
construction of patent claims. The Supreme Court showed apparent def-
erence to the Federal Circuit in affirming its decision. 132 The Court was
particularly concerned with the need to ensure uniformity in the treat-
ment of patents.133 It found that "the importance of uniformity in the
treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues
of construction to the court."'1 34 It also stated "the limits of a patent must
be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the
inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent
will be dedicated ultimately to the public."'1 35 If such limits were not
known, then "a 'zone of uncertainty... would discourage invention'...
and 'the public [would] be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it,
without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights."1 36 Finally,
the Supreme Court noted that when Congress created the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals, a major purpose was to increase uniformity, in order to
"strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster
technological growth and industrial innovation. ' 137 All of these reasons
suggest that the impetus for the Court's decision in Markman was a con-
132. For an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court's deference to the Federal Cir-
cuit's technical and administrative expertise in managing the patent system, see David Sil-
verstein, Patents, Science and Innovation: Historical Linkages and Implications for Global
Technological Competitiveness, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 261, 310 (1991) ("An
overburdened Supreme Court, routinely refusing to review patent cases, made it inevitable
that the [Federal Circuit] would wield far more power than many supporters of this change
had anticipated. For all practical purposes, the [Federal Circuit] has become the 'court of
last resort' in patent cases, and its holdings the 'law of the land."') and Thomas K. Landry,
Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, the Doctrine of Equivalents, and
Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1153 n.8 (1994) (stating that
until recently the Supreme Court was loath to hear patent cases unless the cases focused
upon issues other than patent doctrine).
133. The Supreme Court did not rely upon the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in
reaching its decision. For example, it did not adopt, or even refer to the Federal Circuit's
position that one of the reasons that underlying facts in a patent claim should be deter-
mined by the court was that a patent was more like a statute than a contract. See
Markman, 52 F.3d at 985-87. Also, the Supreme Court did not refer to a line of cases that
the majority of circuit judges claimed supported its position that claims construction was
exclusively for the court. See id. at 977. The existence of such a line of cases was strongly
disputed by the concurring and dissenting judges. See id. at 989-90 n.2, 1017-25. See gener-
ally, Moses, supra note 7, at 220-23, 237 n.375.
134. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
135. Id.
136. See id. (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938);
United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942); Merrill v. Yeomans,
94 U.S. 568 (1876)).
137. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
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viction that the Federal Circuit must have de novo review of the construc-
tion of patent claims in order to accomplish the important goal of having
each patent claim always construed in the same way everywhere in the
United States.
The Court's stated policy reasons for allocating factual issues to the
court in Markman are thus similar to those undergirding another strand
of its traditional jurisprudence-that of finding the Seventh Amendment
inapplicable to federal statutory schemes involving public rights.138 Al-
though this strand of the court's jurisprudence has dealt only with non-
Article III courts, and Markman was decided by an Article III court, the
similarities are nonetheless quite apparent. In Markman, the Court con-
sidered both the heavily federally regulated area of patent law,139 and the
"public" nature of each patent in deciding that disputed factual issues
underlying the construction of claims of a particular patent are not sub-
ject to Seventh Amendment protection. These particular elements-the
high degree of federal regulation, the rights of the public to know the
extent of protection accorded a given patent, and the need for uniformity
of patent claims construction at the national level to promote the nation's
growth and innovation-are not present in most Seventh Amendment
cases, and certainly not in UCC cases. UCC cases are far more likely to
involve private rights than public rights. They generally do not involve a
high degree of federal regulation. There is no need for an appellate court
to have de novo review, because unlike the patent area, there is no partic-
ular public interest that would be harmed by different factual findings
made in different commercial cases. Moreover, UCC cases on appeal are
not heard by a single federal appellate court like the Federal Circuit, but
rather by many different federal and state appellate courts. It is unlikely
that even if uniformity of factual interpretations were considered impor-
tant, it would be achieved when decisions are made in such a multiplicity
of jurisdictions. Thus, none of the reasons that appear to have informed
the Court's decision in Markman seem applicable to UCC cases.
A further indication that Markman is a narrow exception to the Court's
traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence is the unanimity of the de-
cision. The different justices have tended to write passionate dissents
whenever they believed that Seventh Amendment protection was being
either contracted or expanded. 140 In Markman, however, no justice dis-
138. For a fuller discussion of this strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, see
Moses, supra note 7, at 212-17, 231-37.
139. Patent law has a number of unique federally-imposed features. It is entirely fed-
eral, and all patent appeals are heard by one circuit court, the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals. In addition, all patent attorneys and patent agents who practice before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") must pass an examination and be
registered with the PTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1994); 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-.170 (1999).
140. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (dissenting from the majority holding that use of offensive collateral estoppel did not
violate petitioners' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 166 (1973) (Marshall & Stewart, JJ, dissenting) (rejecting the majority view upholding
a six person jury in a civil case); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511
(1959) (Harlan, Whittaker, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (protesting the Court's holding that
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sented or even concurred separately. This suggests that no one on the
Court viewed Markman as making any significant change in the Court's
traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.
Markman itself contains express language limiting its application to the
particular situation in the case. The Court observed, "[w]e need not in
any event consider here whether our conclusion that the Seventh Amend-
ment does not require terms of art in patent claims to be submitted to the
jury supports a similar result in other types of cases. ' 14 1 The Court fur-
ther stated that it was not deciding, "the extent to which the Seventh
Amendment can be said to have crystallized a law/fact distinction ... or
whether post-1791 precedent classifying an issue as one of fact would trig-
ger the protections of the Seventh Amendment if (unlike this case) there
were no more specific reason for decision. '142 The Court here appears to
indicate that it is not saying that a precedent, which arose after 1791, and
which sent factual issues to the jury, was not protected by the Seventh
Amendment. It seems unlikely that the Court in future cases would gen-
erally limit Seventh Amendment protection to law/fact distinctions made
in 1791, in light of its consistent prior jurisprudence holding that the sub-
stance of the Seventh Amendment must be preserved, not the forms and
practices which existed in 1791.143 Such a limitation seems particularly
unlikely in light of the Court's repeated and consistent emphasis on the
importance of the jury's fact-finding role. 144
Supreme Court cases decided after Markman appear to confirm that
any change in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence caused by the
Markman decision did not have major significance outside of the narrow
area of patent claim construction. 145 In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chemical Co., a patent infringement case involving the doctrine of
equivalents, one question was whether judge or jury should apply the
the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial for legal rights tried with equitable rights);
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943) (Black, Douglas, & Murphy, JJ., dis-
senting) (objecting to the majority's sanctioning the expanded use of directed verdict).
141. Markman, 517 U.S. at 383-84 n.9.
142. Id. at 384 n.10 (citations omitted).
143. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390-91. The Court stated:
The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural inci-
dents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791, any more
than it tied them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules
of evidence then prevailing. Nor were "the rules of the common law" then
prevalent, including those relating to the procedure by which the judge regu-
lated the jury's role on questions of fact, crystallized in a fixed and immuta-
ble system. On the contrary, they were constantly changing and developing
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Id.
144. The Seventh Amendment "requires that questions of fact in common law actions
shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume directly or indirectly to take
from the jury or to itself such prerogative." Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S.
593, 596 (1897).
145. See e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999); Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998); Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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doctrine of equivalents. 146 The Federal Circuit, en banc, had held this
was a question of fact to be determined by the jury.147 The Supreme
Court, while declaring that it did not have to decide this issue in order to
resolve the question before the Court, nonetheless acknowledged that
there was "ample support in [its] prior cases to support the Federal Cir-
cuit's holding."'1 48 The Court concluded, "[n]othing in our recent decision
in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., necessitates a different result
than that reached by the Federal Circuit. '149 This suggests that although
the Court found the Seventh Amendment did not protect the jury trial
right with respect to determining disputed terms of art in a patent claim,
it still views patent infringement issues-particularly the doctrine of
equivalents-as within the province of the jury. 150
The Court also followed a traditional Seventh Amendment analysis in
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.151 in holding that a provision
of the Copyright Act of 1976152 violated the right to a jury trial. It ap-
plied the historical test in a manner consistent with the first strand of
traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, looking at both the na-
ture of the action and the remedy sought, to determine if there was a
jury-trial right. The decision was also consistent with the second strand,
which emphasizes the importance of the jury's fact-finding role. The Felt-
ner Court held that the determination of damages is a factual question
"peculiarly within the province of the jury."'153 Thus, making no refer-
ence to the Markman case, the Court in Feltner followed a traditional
Seventh Amendment analysis to find unconstitutional a provision of a
federal statute that impinged upon the jury's province of fact finding.
In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, the Supreme Court affirmed
lower court decisions that issues were properly sent to the jury in an in-
verse condemnation action. 154 Del Monte Dunes owned beachfront
property, which it had not been able to develop because the City of Mon-
terey kept changing the requirements for approval. Del Monte ultimately
sued the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, a violation of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and an uncompensated and therefore unconstitutional regulatory
146. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21. The doctrine of equivalents permits a find-
ing of infringement even in the absence of literal infringement "if there is 'equivalence'
between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the
patented invention." Id.
147. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 520 U.S.17 (1997).
148. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 38.
149. Id. (citation omitted).
150. The court did leave open, however, the possibility that it might reach a different
conclusion if the issue were squarely presented to it. See id. at 39.
151. 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
152. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
153. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 353 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
154. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
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taking.155 A jury verdict in favor of Del Monte on the takings claim was
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.156 One of the questions before the Su-
preme Court was whether issues of liability were properly submitted to
the jury on the takings claim. The analysis of the majority, although using
some of the language of the Markman decision, in fact adopted a tradi-
tional jurisprudential approach. Unlike the Markman formula, which did
not include the remedy prong of the historical test, Justice Kennedy ap-
plied both prongs-the nature of the action and the remedy sought-to
see if such an action or its analogue would have had a jury-trial right at
common law in 1791. He concluded that this was an action at law. With
respect to the second prong of the Markman test-whether the particular
trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of
the common law right as it existed in 1791-Justice Kennedy reframed
the question as "whether the particular issues of liability were proper for
determination by the jury."'51 7 He then determined that if the issue is of
the kind that is proper for jury resolution, then it must go to the jury to
preserve the jury-trial right. This formulation is much closer to tradi-
tional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, where the Court has held that
the jury's fact-finding role must be preserved as the substance of the jury-
trial right. Ultimately, the majority held that the issues were fact-based,
and properly submitted to the jury. Thus, the analysis in Del Monte sug-
gests that the Court has not abandoned its traditional Seventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence with respect to the importance of sending factual
issues in actions at law to the jury. 158
The Markman case, as noted above, is inconsistent with much of tradi-
tional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. It appears highly unlikely,
however, that the Court would apply a Markman analysis in a UCC case
brought in federal court to take facts away from the jury because the
rights involved in commercial and contract cases are clearly private rights,
which have had a long tradition at common law as actions at law for
money damages, entitled to a trial by jury.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Even if one were to believe that the specific allocations to the court in
the UCC do not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial, one must
155. See id. at 698. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been applied to the states as part of the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. amend. XIV, §1. Therefore, an
uncompensated takings claim is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.
156. See Del Monte, 526 U.S. at 699.
157. Id. at 718.
158. The dissenters concluded there was no right to a jury trial because in their view an
inverse condemnation action was not significantly different from a direct condemnation
action. They referred to law that found no right to a jury trial in a direct condemnation
action, even though it was characterized as an action at law. See Del Monte, 526 U.S. at 733
(O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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nonetheless consider whether policy considerations support the gradual
erosion of the jury in UCC cases. Rhetoric favoring and opposing the
civil jury has been and continues to be deliberately developed by groups
who favor specific political agendas. The best organized, according to
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, authors of Civil Juries and the Polit-
ics of Reform, are the conservative organizations and the advocacy-ori-
ented corporate foundations and think tanks which would like to limit or
eliminate the civil jury. 159 In recent times, many businesses have ex-
pressed hostility toward juries, 160 asserting that juries have attitudes that
are anti-business, 61 and that they tend to decide cases against the defen-
dant with the deepest pockets.162 The rhetoric against juries is designed
to develop attitudes and policies that favor reducing the juries' role.163
The sections below will review the anti-jury rhetoric, and will consider the
gap between this rhetoric and empirically-based studies of jury
performance.
A. RHETORIC ON REDUCING ROLE OF THE JURIES
A reason typically offered for reducing the role of juries is that in cer-
tain areas, juries do not do as good a job as judges. Assertions are made
that judges are more capable of correctly deciding complicated or techni-
cal issues and are more likely to render decisions that are predictable,
consistent, and efficient. Viewed from this perspective, juries are seen as
unpredictable, 164 less likely to understand complex issues, 165 less sympa-
thetic to large business interests, 166 and more likely to make awards
159. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF RE-
FORM 246 (1995). The authors specifically refer to the work of the Manhattan Institute, the
John M. Olin Foundation, and the Monsanto Foundation.
160. John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Execu-
tives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1, 51 (1998).
161. See id. at 34-35.
162. In a Business Week survey of senior corporate executives, a main reason given by
them as to why litigation and civil justice costs were so high was "the knowledge that major
corporate defendants and their insurance companies have deep pockets." Mark N. Vamos,
The Verdict from the Corner Office, Bus. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 66, cited in Valerie P. Hans,
The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 327, 329 (1998) [hereinafter Hans, Illusions].
163. In an article in the ABA Journal on the anti-jury movement, Mark Curriden as-
serted, "The movement against juries has been so successful that even many conservative
legal scholars now fear an erosion in the moral authority of the American jury system and
the constitutional right to have conflicts decided by juries." Mark Curriden, Putting the
Squeeze on Juries, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2000, at 53.
164. See Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 268-69 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (many
business executives believe civil juries are unpredictable) [hereinafter Hans, Attitudes];
James E. Byrne, Revised UCC Section 5-108(e): A Constitutional Nudge to Courts, 29 UCC
L.J. 419 (1997) ("The involvement of juries has only exacerbated the widely held percep-
tion that the system is arbitrary and unable to produce sound principled results.").
165. See Jonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the Traditional Civil Jury: The Effects of
Changes in Composition and Procedures, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
416-19 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (discussing criticisms of the traditional jury).
166. Sandra Stern, Revised Article 5 Brings Uniformity, Predictability to Letters of
Credit, 143 NEW JERSEY L.J., Feb. 26, 1996, at 803.
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based on the deep pocket of the defendant. 167 Jury trials are also criti-
cized as an inefficient use of judicial resources, because of the additional
time added to a trial for jury selection and deliberation, as well as for side
bar conferences and resolving evidentiary disputes.16 It has also been
suggested that when decisions as to factual issues are allocated to judges
to determine as a matter of law, more cases will be decided on summary
judgment, creating greater efficiency in the court system. 169
B. EMPIRICAL DATA ON JURY PERFORMANCE
Aside from possible constitutional objections, a major objection to re-
ducing the jury's role and thereby expanding the role of the judge is that
in large measure, criticisms of the jury's performance are not supported
by empirical studies of jury performance. These studies show that in gen-
eral, juries perform quite competently.' 70 With respect to a jury's han-
dling of technical or complex issues, a number of studies have concluded
that juries handle complex issues well, and that there is no reason to be-
lieve that judges fare better in the face of complexity than jurors. 171
167. See Lande, supra note 160, at 34-35; see also Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury
Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Build-
ing, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1989) (for an account of the role of the insurance
industry in blaming the civil justice system, and particularly juries, for the lack of afforda-
ble insurance, in order to divert attention away from a solution justifying substantially
greater industry regulation).
168. See Casper, supra note 165, at 417. Proponents of the jury assert that the anti-jury
movement is motivated by powerful interests groups, which cannot control the jury pro-
cess. Arthur Bryant, executive director of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, put it this way,
"Money talks in Congress. Money talks with the executive and regulatory branches. But
money has no influence on juries .... You can't lobby juries or buy their votes, and that
scares a lot of powerful people who want the control." Curriden, supra note 163, at 54.
169. Paragraph 5 of official comment 1 to 5-108(e) provides in pertinent part:
[I]t is hoped that there will be more consistency in the outcomes and speedier
resolution of disputes if the responsibility for determining the nature and
scope of standard practice is granted to the court, not to a jury. Granting the
court authority to make these decisions will also encourage the salutary prac-
tice of courts' granting summary judgment in circumstances where there are
no significant factual disputes.
U.C.C. § 5-108(e) cmt.1, para.5 (revised 1995).
170. See Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve
Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 234 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993);
Mark Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1109
(1996) ("[S]erious students of the jury are virtually unanimous in their high regard for the
jury as a decision-maker .... [R]esearchers concur that jurors on the whole are conscien-
tious, that they collectively understand and recall the evidence as well as judges, and that
they decide factual issues on the basis of the evidence presented."); Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1124 (1992). For other discussions of jury competence, see Daniels, supra note 167,
at 269; VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986); Neil Vidmar, Pap
and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About Jury Behavior and the
Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205 (1994); Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Mak-
ing: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987); and Roselle L. Wissler
et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Law-
yers, 98 MIcH. L. REV. 751 (1999).
171. See Lempert, supra note 170, at 234. John Guinther, in his book, The Jury in
America, noted that a research study published by the Federal Judicial Center in 1981,
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There is little if any empirical evidence to suggest that decisions made by
judges are superior to those made by juries.172 Moreover, there are no
studies showing that judges render decisions that are more predictable or
consistent than those of juries,173 and there are studies suggesting the
opposite. 174
A recent article noted that lack of predictability is a problem with arbi-
trators and judges, as well as with jurors. Businesses that have chosen
arbitration in order to avoid a jury trial have sometimes been surprised
by the result.
Many businesses have been knee-deep in an arbitration hearing only
to come to the startling and frightening realization that the unpre-
dictability of 12 jurors has been replaced by the unpredictability of
one individual. Perhaps even more significant, business combatants
came to realize that even well trained professional arbitrators are not
completely immune to the emotion, sympathy or prejudice often
found in lay jurors. This is because disputes often come down to
questions of credibility rather than "business realities." As a result,
which had been designed to assay the abilities of juries in complicated cases, concluded
that:
Judges and lawyers were uniformly complimentary of the diligence of the
juries. With slightly less consensus, they also affirmed the validity of the ju-
ries' deliberative processes .... Almost without exception, respondents who
acknowledged the existence of difficult issues in their jury trials also men-
tioned explicitly that the jury had made the correct decision or that the jury
had no difficulty applying the legal standards to the facts.
JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 213 (1988) (emphasis in original).
172. In their article, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, supra note 170, at
1151-53, Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg note that the most important deter-
minant of a verdict is not whether the case is decided by a judge or a jury, but rather the
strength of the evidence. They cite research which supports the view of juries as good fact-
finders, not overly generous on awards, and able to handle complex cases. With respect to
a comparison between the performance of judges and juries they state:
[T]he evidence, such as it is, consistently supports a view of the jury as gener-
ally unbiased and competent, or at least so compared to a judge .... Related
research indeed suggests that a jury could even outperform a judge, because
the judge is also human and groups typically outperform individuals by virtue
of superiority in such tasks as recall of facts and correction of errors.
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 170, at 1151-53 (citing ROBERT J. MACCOUN, GETING
INSIDE THE BLACK Box: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL JURY BEHAVIOR
22-23 (1987)).
173. See Lempert, supra note 170, at 217.
In short, we have no reliable empirical basis for saying that litigants are more
likely in judge than in jury trials to receive decisions based on a rational
evaluation of the evidence. . . . Both judges and jurors are human. As
factfinders in complex cases, judges and juries are probably more like each
other than they are different in dealing with the problems they confront.
Id.
174. For example, a study of the magistrates of New York City conducted by Charles
Haines showed that in cases of disorderly conduct, one judge discharged 18 percent of the
defendants, another 54 percent, and another discharged only one defendant in 566 cases.
See Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and
Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REV. 96, 105 (1923). Haines
found that "the magistrates differed to an amazing degree in their treatment of similar
classes of cases" and concluded that "justice is a personal thing, reflecting the tempera-
ment, the personality, the education, environment, and personal traits of the magistrates."
Id.
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all dispute resolvers-whether judge, jury or arbitrator-base their
decisions in part on their own internal criteria, subject to influence,
sympathy and prejudice.17 5
As the article noted, judges as well as arbitrators make decisions that may
be heavily influenced by their personal world view, and therefore may
not be predictable.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that appears to contradict the
conventional belief that judges are far superior to jurors in being able to
disregard information that is considered to be too prejudicial to be admit-
ted in evidence. An important function of judges is to prevent such po-
tentially biasing evidence from reaching jurors, who are considered more
susceptible to bias than judges. Judges themselves, because of their train-
ing and education, are expected to be able to disregard such information.
A study by Stephan Landsman and Richard F. Rakos provided empirical
evidence that judges and jurors appeared to be similarly influenced by
exposure to potentially biasing material. 176 The study noted that while
judges and jurors both shared the belief that judges had a superior capac-
ity to remain unbiased, in fact, judges and jurors may not be very differ-
ent in their reactions to potentially biasing information. 177 This study
suggests that the unexamined opinion that decisions by jurors are more
likely to be biased than decisions by courts is simply not supported by the
empirical research that exists, and more research should be done in this
area, given the impact this assumption has on the way we organize our
civil justice system.
The effect of restricting the right to a jury trial is to impose a limitation
on the parties' choice. Not surprisingly, studies have shown that lawyers
choose the fact-finder they believe gives them the best chance of win-
ning.178 In one study of eleven lawyers in protracted cases that could be
tried before either judge or jury, the lawyers explained their choices al-
most solely in terms of the judge's reputation. Where the judge was re-
puted to be incompetent or biased, the lawyers opted for a jury. Where a
judge was chosen over a jury, the most important reasons listed were the
competence and fairness of the judge. One attorney specifically noted
that he looked on jury trials as "buffers against incompetent judges. 179
Requiring a case to be decided by the judge eliminates the possibility of
choosing this buffer.
175. Jeff Tillotson, Debunking Arbitration Myths, 147 NEW JERSEY L.J., Mar. 3, 1997, at
1015.
176. See Stephen Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect
of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 113, 125 (1994).
177. See id. The authors suggest that while more research is needed to confirm this
outcome, if confirmed, "it would draw into question the law's insistence on treating judges
and jurors in radically different ways .... Id. They conclude that "the civil justice system
has come to rely on a behavioral assumption about judges that deserves far closer scrutiny
than it has, as yet, received." Id. at 126.




In terms of the quality of jury decision-making, commentators have
noted that the most significant observer of the jury is the judge, who has
the greatest opportunity to observe the civil jury in action. Surveys of
judges' attitudes toward civil juries show virtually unanimous support for
the institution.' 80
Thus, arguments against using juries in commercial cases based on
competence or predictability do not appear to be supported by reliable
evidence. Rather, they appear to reflect the beliefs of economically pow-
erful business groups which think juries are less likely than judges to de-
cide in their favor. 181 Even this belief is not supported by empirical data.
In an analysis of data from a study of Arizona jury reform, Valerie P.
Hans found that "civil jurors are largely supportive of the aims of Ameri-
can business and extremely concerned about the potential negative ef-
fects on business corporations of excessive litigation. ' 182 She concluded
that there was no evidence that juries were predisposed against business
defendants, or that judges would have decided the cases very differ-
ently. 183 Judges who evaluated the cases were satisfied with jury out-
comes and expressed little surprise at jury decisions.184
In sum, empirical evidence does not support a generally negative view
of juries. Nor does it support the view that judges are less biased, or are
superior decision makers. 85 The policy reasons for not reducing the role
of juries are twofold: first, on the whole juries perform competently, and
second, when a statute designates specific issues to be determined by the
judge, this eliminates the possibility for the parties to choose between a
bench and a jury trial. Having the choice of a jury can be an important
means of dealing with the limitations of a particular judge, and preserving
the parties' sense of the fairness of the process. The fact that judges
themselves, on the whole, generally agree with jury verdicts, even in busi-
ness cases, suggests that there is no strong policy reason to take juries out
of commercial cases.
VI. THE ROLE OF ARTICLE 1
Given the fact that recent UCC provisions as drafted contain certain
constitutionally troubling provisions, is there a role for Article 1 with re-
spect to this issue? Entitled "General Provisions", Article 1 sets forth
rules of construction, policies, general definitions, and principles of inter-
180. See Hans, Attitudes, supra note 164, at 261-65. Hans concludes as follows: "Judges
report that, in general, they agree with jury verdicts and strongly support the civil jury's
soundness as an institution." Id. at 275.
181. See George McGunnigle, Representing the Corporate Defendant in the Courtroom:
Reflections of a Veteran Advocate, in VIEWS FROM THE COURTROOM 1, 3-4 (1993).
182. Hans, Illusions, supra note 162, at 327-28, 341-43.
183. See id.; see also Milo Geyelin, Study Suggests Jurors are not Anti-Business, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 20, 1992, at B1 (jurors mistakenly perceived to be anti-corporate).
184. See Hans, Illusions, supra note 162, at 341.
185. Many a lawyer has experienced the tyranny of an idiosyncratic judge. This author
was before one judge whom her opposing counsel characterized as "like a porcupine. He
flips his tail and everyone gets hurt."
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pretation. A traditional purpose of Article 1 has been to provide a means
of harmonizing other provisions in the UCC. Article 1 sets out, for exam-
ple, definitions that are common to all articles, unless trumped by more
specific provisions within each article. It also provides that provisions of
the UCC may be varied by agreement unless otherwise provided in the
Act, except that parties may not disclaim obligations of good faith, dili-
gence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by the Act.18 6
Article 1 sets forth the general policies that are to be applied in both
interpreting and performing under the UCC. The Article is to be liber-
ally construed in order to promote its underlying purposes and poli-
cies. 187 Those are defined in Section 1-102 as: "(1) to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit
the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage
and agreement of the parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions."'1 88 Additionally, there are policies that remedies
should be liberally construed to make parties whole, 189 that "[e]very con-
tract or duty ... imposes an obligation of good faith,"'190 that interpreta-
tion of contracts must be informed by trade usage and evidence of the
commercial context.191 These policies are considered applicable to all ar-
ticles of the UCC.
Should Article 1, in addition, contain any stated policy concerning the
importance of interpreting the provisions of the UCC consistent with the
constitutional guarantee of a jury trial? 192 In answering this question, it is
useful to look at the different constitutional perspectives of those who
favor expanding the role of judges in fact-finding, and thereby restricting
the jury-trial right, and those in favor of not expanding the role of judges,
but rather following the traditional allocation of issues between judge and
jury.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE IN FAVOR OF EXPANDING
JUDGE'S ROLE
Proponents of expanding the judge's role, and thereby limiting the role
of juries, take the position that a statutory provision assigning certain fac-
tual issues to the court is probably not a constitutional violation; but even
if the provision might be unconstitutional, it should nonetheless be incor-
porated in the legislation and resolved by private litigation through the
186. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2000).
187. Id. § 1-102(1).
188. Id. § 1-102(2)(a)-(c).
189. Id. § 1-106(1).
190. Id. § 1-203.
191. Id. § 1-205.
192. I first set out to answer the question whether certain factual issues can or should
be assigned to the judge rather than the jury. This question served as the subject for a
report prepared in collaboration with David V. Snyder for a Working Group discussion in
the ABA Subcommittee on Article 1, in 1997. The ABA Subcommittee on Article 1 pro-
vides input to the Article 1 drafting committee.
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courts. 193 Proponents also believe that drafters of UCC provisions
should push to the limit to avoid jury trials. For example, with respect to
Section 5-108(e), one of the proponents has stated,
[W]hat Section 5-108(e) provides is guidance to the court that it
should reserve such questions [such as whether a party satisfied a
standard] to itself to the outer limit of the constitutional trial by jury.
What those limits are is, of course, within the court's judgment and
the role of the jury beyond those outer limits is inviolate and is not
and cannot be touched by this provision.
One would have thought that this conclusion would have been forthcom-
ing in any event under general principles of statutory interpretation by
which any ambiguity with regard to the constitutionality of a statute is
resolved in favor of the constitutional construction. 194
Thus, this view seems to be that the drafters should push the envelope
as far as possible, and not worry if they cross the line because either: (1)
individual litigants will bring suits to uphold the constitution; or (2) courts
will either disregard the statute or construe it narrowly to be constitu-
tional given the particular court's understanding of what the constitution
requires; or (3) no one will raise the issue, and there will be fewer jury
trials.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE IN FAVOR OF
TRADITIONAL ALLOCATION
It seems clear that UCC drafters should not and do not wish to propose
uniform laws which are unconstitutional. The policy question is whether
it is prudent to push to the limits, and even beyond, in the hope that the
allocation to the court will either go unchallenged, or if challenged, that
the provision will be construed by a court so as to avoid a determination
of unconstitutionality.
1. Placing the Burden on Individual Litigants
Opponents of the "push to the outer limits" position would assert that
drafting laws of questionable constitutional validity does not seem appro-
priate for groups such as ALI and NCCUSL. Since the purpose is to
create uniform laws, presenting laws that appear to invite constitutional
challenge would not appear to promote either uniformity or confidence
in the process. Further, putting the burden on an individual to challenge
constitutionality, rather than choosing a course that is clearly constitu-
tional, can also undermine confidence in the process. Members of the
drafting committee tend to come from economically powerful groups.
Proposing questionably constitutional laws and justifying them by saying
that they can be challenged by individuals, ignores the reality that many
193. See discussion in Margaret L. Moses, The Uniform Commercial Code Meets the
Seventh Amendment. The Demise of Jury Trials Under Article 5?, 72 IND. L.J., 681, 717
n.191 (1997).
194. Byrne, supra note 164, at 426.
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individuals who will be disadvantaged by the lack of a jury trial will not
have the resources to launch a constitutional challenge.
2. Relying on the Courts Not to Enforce the Statute
Even if it were agreed that "pushing to the outer limits" is a good pol-
icy based on the reasons provided by the proponents, it may not be a
good policy for other reasons. First, in each state, under each state consti-
tution, allocating fact-finding to a judge would create a litigable issue,
which in itself is undesirable, and which also could tend to result in non-
uniform law. Second, if the statute itself is either ambiguous or unconsti-
tutional, so that each judge must come up with his or her own reading of
the statute, the purpose of uniform laws again appears to be undercut.
Third, pushing the envelope to this extent may undercut the credibility of
the drafters as experts whose competence is so highly regarded that their
proposals should be passed without change.
3. Is This an Appropriate Issue for Decision by the Drafters of
Uniform Laws?
Even assuming arguendo that allocating a particular factual issue to a
judge could pass constitutional muster, the policy decision involved does
not seem to be one best made by uniform commercial law experts. First,
their expertise is generally not in this area, since they are commercial
lawyers, not litigators. Second, in making this determination, they appear
to have little access to or concern for obtaining pertinent factual and em-
pirical information about juries, judges, and their respective competen-
cies and constitutional roles.195 Third, this kind of sensitive policy
decision should perhaps be better initiated at the legislative level, rather
than by uniform law commissioners.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the policy choice is whether it is better to draft laws that are
clearly within constitutional requirements and do not change the tradi-
tional allocation of factual issues to the jury, or whether reasons opposed
to jury decision-making justify pushing the envelope to the "outer limit,"
and perhaps beyond, in order to reduce the role of juries in UCC cases.
Since that choice has already been made in several instances in favor of
pushing to the outer limits or beyond, it is now pertinent to consider
whether it would be appropriate for Article 1 to include among the gen-
eral policies for interpreting the UCC a statement of policy or purpose
with respect to the right of a jury trial. A proposal was made in the
American Bar Association Subcommittee on Article 1 to include the fol-
lowing language as a new provision: "No provision of this Act prohibits
the court from determining that an issue is an issue of fact and not of law
in accordance with the legal or constitutional right of a party to a trial by
195. See Rubin, supra note 29, at 762.
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jury with respect to the issue. 1 96 The proposed official comment accom-
panying the text stated that although the purpose of provisions such as
Sections 1-201, 4A-202(c), and 5-108(e) is to articulate a policy that favors
judicial resolution of the specified issue, nonetheless,
a court may determine that a party is entitled to a jury trial on an
issue as a matter of right under the Seventh Amendment, or under
the constitution of the applicable state jurisdiction, even though the
literal application of a provision of the Code might state that the
issue is for the court to decide. 197
Ultimately, the Subcommittee voted to recommend to the Article 1 draft-
ing committee that a comment be added to Revised Article 1, Section 103
(existing Article 1, Section 102) which would "preserv[e] a party's right to
trial by jury of an issue of fact consistent with any constitutional right of
the party despite provisions containing contrary language in the Act.' 98
This comment would perhaps serve a clarifying purpose, encouraging
judges to follow their understanding of the proper role of the jury as
finder of fact. The language is also consistent with the position of those
who believe it to be appropriate to push to the outer limits in drafting
laws that take issues from the jury, and who want individual judges to
find a way to interpret such laws as constitutional, even if it means some-
times giving issues to the jury when the statute says the issue is for the
court. To include in Article 1 a policy statement that courts really should
act in a constitutional way, despite the express language of the UCC,
raises two important questions. First, is pushing the envelope with re-
spect to restricting the jury's role in UCC cases now the agreed-upon
policy for the whole UCC? It is submitted that such a policy would be
premature, if not wrongheaded, in light of existing empirical evidence
supporting the competence of the jury, and the parties' need for choice.
Before such a policy is adopted, more discussion and research is needed
concerning the actual role played by the jury in commercial cases. Sec-
ond, do drafters of commercial laws have the necessary expertise to make
sensitive policy decisions, such as shifting allocations from jury to judge,
and to understand fully the consequences of such decisions? It is one
thing for the various state legislatures to defer to individuals of renowned
expertise in commercial law for the purpose of adopting uniform com-
mercial laws, but quite another to adopt provisions of law which do not
reflect that expertise, and which appear to have been made without ade-
quate information, study, or justification. The continuing credibility of
such drafting groups is at risk when provisions they draft, which are not
within the realm of their expertise in commercial law, are deemed to be
196. Proposal by Subcommittee member Paul Turner contained in fax from the chair of
the ABA Subcommittee on Article 1, Sarah Jenkins, to members of Subcommittee, dated
February 4, 1999, on file with author and with Subcommittee on Article 1.
197. Id.
198. Fax reporting action taken at Subcommittee's March 2000 meeting, from Sarah
Howard Jenkins, Chair, ABA Subcommittee on UCC Article 1, to Professor Neil B. Co-
hen, Reporter, Revised Article 1 Drafting Committee, on file with author and with Sub-
committee on Article 1.
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unconstitutional, or at best constitutionally troubling, by law revisions
commissions, state committees, and commentators who have studied
them.
Since Article 1 sets forth the policies for the entire UCC, until such
time as there is a better informed consensus on the role of juries, perhaps
Article 1 should incorporate a policy statement based on currently availa-
ble empirical evidence, as to the value of the parties' choice of a jury, and
the value of not undermining in letter or in spirit the rights granted by
our federal and state constitutions. Such a provision could be added, for
example, in Part II, "General Definitions and Principles of Interpreta-
tion," to this effect: "The jury trial right under this Act extends to all
parties to the full extent of federal or state constitutional and statutory
law or policy."
With respect to UCC provisions which currently raise constitutional
questions, it would be quite simple to move the definition of "conspicu-
ousness" to Article 1, delete the sentence providing that conspicuousness
should be decided by the court, and provide a comment similar to the one
in the March 1997 draft of Article 2-that depending upon the circum-
stances, the decision is for the trier of fact. As to Sections 4A-202(c) and
5-108(e), the most sensible approach in this author's view would be to
amend the provisions so that they permit the traditional allocation of fac-
tual issues to the jury, and legal issues to the judge. This would avoid
unnecessary constitutional challenges and would promote uniform appli-
cation of the law, thereby accomplishing one of the express underlying
purposes and policies of the Act.
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